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The machine in the colony: technology, 
politics, and the typography of Devanagari 
in the early years of mechanization 
Abstract 
The decades of 1930s and 40s in which India’s struggle against British rule gained momentum 
also ushered in critical technological change in the way texts in many Indian languages were 
materially produced and represented in print. The foremost facilitators of this change were 
third parties precariously placed in the colonial equation. Focusing on the dilemmas and 
contradictions of one such concern, the New York-based Mergenthaler Linotype Company and 
its program for the Devanagari script, this essay examines the mechanics of the power struggle 
embodied in the process of technological and typographical change. Against the backdrop of 
India’s independence movement, in deeply contested territories of language and script, the 
examination of typographical networks that formulated and realized this project throws new 
light on the richly ambivalent ideological negotiations involved – between popular and 
academic aspirations, altruistic and commercial enterprises, communal agendas and 
nationalist politics, and between imperial administration and colonial subjects. 
Keywords: Devanagari, India, Linotype, Nationalism, Colonialism, Technology 
• • • 
On 18th June 1933 the New York Herald Tribune carried a feature story under the 
title “Teaching a sixth of the world to read”, with only a slightly more modest 
subheading: now a machine is to carry literacy to India.  This was effectively the 1
first public announcement for not one but two products of the Brooklyn-based 
Mergenthaler Linotype Company (henceforth referred to as Mergenthaler). The first 
of these products was “Devanagari Linotype”, the hot-metal Linotype machine, as 
adapted to compose Devanagari text. The second was “Linotype Devanagari”, a 
rendition – and simplification – of the Devanagari script in the form of the typeface 
carried on the Linotype machine. The Herald Tribune article, broadly situating this 
new development within the perceived educational and literary contexts of India, 
highlighted two questions of fundamental interest and significance to any historical 
enquiry – namely that the impetus for this development should have come from 
America, and that this seemingly altruistic foray should have come from what was 
primarily a commercial enterprise. To these may be added the equally critical 
question of why this development should have come about in 1933, not any earlier or 
later. It was indeed the first time that mechanical composition of the linecasting 
variety in any Indian script had been realized, a good three decades after the 
technology had been developed and established in the provinces of print in the 
western world.  2
It can be argued that, for the most part, technologically deterministic views of 
typographic change have formed the basis of historical narratives of Indian scripts 
 Written by Gove Hambidge, a feature writer at the Herald Tribune, and illustrated with photographs 1
from William Norman Brown. “How Devanagari looks in machine-set characters”: a sample of Linotype 
Devanagari, making its first public appearance anywhere in print, was reproduced on page 21.
 Linecasting refers to mechanical composition systems (such as Linotype, Intertype) where a line of 2
matrices is assembled to cast a full line, as opposed to individual pieces of type. A few earlier instances of 
Devanagari mechanical composition did exist prior to the 1930s: in the form of smaller-scale machines 
like typewriters as well as the Monotype Corporation’s hot-metal Devanagari project initiated in 1921. The 
Mergenthaler Linotype Company followed its Devanagari machine of 1933 with a Gujarati adaptation in 
1935 and Bengali in 1936.
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and their material representation.  Persisting with the common but reductive 3
explanation that all typographic limitations have been limitations of technology, 
however, sidesteps a significant range of questions – not only those about the place 
and role of typographic networks within larger social and political realms, but also of 
power relations within the processes of design and technology involved in enabling 
text-based communication. Unsurprisingly, histories recounted from the point of 
view of the makers and manufacturers often revolve around origin and 
dissemination: narratives of invention and innovation in a specific time and place 
and its subsequent transmission elsewhere, positing the latter process as well as 
geographies largely inconsequential.   4
Technology and its manifestations – the printing press, perhaps most famously – 
have been cast as the agents, or the historical actors, in the process of change.  But it 5
is useful to acknowledge that technology also comes in the purview of other kinds of 
agency, particularly that of its adopters and eventual users in a given social 
circumstance. It is in turn “acted upon” by forces and entities that have usually not 
been accorded significant positions in narratives that insist on portraying 
technological progress as the most significant force, or as an autonomous 
phenomenon existing outside of social, cultural, and political settings. A machine 
could indeed be the agent of change but time and location matter beyond its point of 
origin, and as this essay will argue, beyond notions of departure and arrival that are 
lodged firmly in expressions like “the coming of print” and “technology transfer”. In 
the case of Linotype in India, the argument can be extended precisely by subverting 
the long-standing association of the machine with movement and examining, as it 
were, the machine at rest: not only grounded in specific cultural circumstance but 
also sans the universality of its assumed function. The same machine that 
represented an innovation in twentieth-century New York, an object of interest and 
an exhibit in imperial London, could serve as an instrument of power, or a site for 
social struggle, in colonial Bombay and Calcutta. This essay will concern itself with 
some of the less examined aspects of the acculturation of the Linotype in the context 
of its adaptation to compose Devanagari. 
The machine in the making: conflict, collusion, and the 
mechanics of empire 
The Indian subcontinent is home to a rich diversity of languages and scripts – well 
over 1500 languages are spoken within its wide expanse, with more than twenty of 
these possessing upwards of a million speakers each. There have been twenty-two 
officially recognised languages in the country, written mainly in ten scripts (i.e. many 
languages often share the same script).  These scripts can be broadly divided into 6
two geographical groups: northern and southern. The northern Indian scripts are 
 This is predominantly the case where type and typography are in focus, see for instance Bapurao S. 3
Naik, Typography of Devanagari (Bombay: Directorate of Languages, 1971); B. S. Kesavan, History of 
Printing and Publishing in India: a Story of Cultural Reawakening (New Delhi: National Book Trust, 
1997). See also, Richard Southall, Printer’s Type in the Twentieth Century: Manufacturing and Design 
Methods (New Castle and London: The British Library and Oak Knoll Press, 2005). On the other hand in 
book history related enquiries technology often features as an incidental or unproblematic detail, or as a 
parallel and autonomous historical strand. See Francesca Orsini (ed.) The History of the Book in South 
Asia (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013).
 See for instance, Andrew Boag and Christopher Burke (eds.) History of the Monotype Corporation 4
(London: PHS and Vanbrugh Press, 2014); Frank Romano, History of the Linotype Company (Rochester: 
RIT Press, 2014).
 Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural 5
Transformations in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
 Based on the Census of India (2001), which lists 22 scheduled languages and 100 non-scheduled 6
languages: a “scheduled” language refers to the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution which lists 
officially recognized languages in the country.
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Devanagari, Gurmukhi, Gujarati, Bengali/Assamese, and Oriya. Southern Indian 
scripts comprise Tamil, Telugu, Kannada and Malayalam. Perso-Arabic has been 
used extensively in many parts in India and across the subcontinent, in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. What is of greater significance in this context, however, is that regions 
are not exclusive in their use of language and script – it is certainly not unusual to 
find more than two in use at the same time. 
This diversity has had a long and varied history – on some occasions having been 
celebrated as a desirable and enviable quality, and on others, disapproved of as a 
source of confusion and unnecessary complication, especially in the context of 
having to print in more than one language and script within a “national” or 
“regional” framework. The relationship of language and script to printing in the 
subcontinent constitutes a complex history, having been driven by the interests and 
the involvement of diverse bodies: missionaries, merchants, colonisers, local elites, 
administrators, and colonial subjects. Their respective, often intertwining, 
approaches to textual traditions, scholarship, access to information and its 
circulation have historically prompted a variety of responses and transformations. 
Various languages like Tamil, Bengali, Persian, and Urdu/Hindi gained prominence 
in print in different regions, at different junctures, alongside projects of codification 
and formalisation that extended debates over language and script, particularly in 
relation to the definition culture, tradition, and identity.  The most interesting 7
manifestations of this phenomenon are to be found in eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century printing in Indian scripts, especially as a British enterprise.  The debate over 8
language and script has been a long and continuing one, leading Orientalist and 
linguistic scholars in the nineteenth century to ponder not only a hierarchy of the 
most prominent or “appropriate” scripts for a language and a region, but also to 
make a case for the substitution of one script with another – or at times simply to 
abolish the use of the numerous scripts of India and replace them with the Latin 
alphabet.  Sporadic instances of this debate continued to appear throughout the 9
colonial period, and with the gradual strengthening of nationalist sensibilities from 
the latter half of the nineteenth century, the issue regained prominence by 
transforming the hierarchical colonial frameworks into an indigenized quest for a 
“national” language and script.  The nature of this debate tended to remain limited 10
to political assertions or nationalistic arguments, without necessarily leading to a 
greater interest in the scholarly and practical aspects of the scripts and their 
historical development. Unsurprisingly, across this period the most prominent 
typographic development in the subcontinent were initiated and carried out by 
missionaries of various denominations, or colonial administrators and institutions, 
using Indian labour and local workforce that they subsequently trained.   11
 For a detailed overview see Vasudha Dalmia, The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu 7
Harischandra and Nineteenth-Century Banaras (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997); Christopher R. 
King, One Language, Two Scripts: the Hindi Movement in Nineteenth Century North India (Bombay: 
Oxford University Press, 1994). For the early history of printing in various Indian languages see Anant K. 
Priolkar, The Printing Press in India: its Beginnings and Early Development (Bombay: Marathi 
Samshodhana Mandala, 1958).
 For instance the projects of linguistic discrimination initiated in the works of British scholars at the 8
College of Fort William in Calcutta at the turn of the nineteenth century. Sisir Kumar Das, Sahibs and 
Munshis: an Account of the College of Fort William (New Delhi: Orion Publications, 1978), 36–59.  
 See for instance, Charles Trevelyan, The Application of the Roman Alphabet to All the Oriental 9
Languages (Serampore: Serampore Press, 1834); Monier Williams (ed.), Original Papers Illustrating the 
History of the Application of the Roman Alphabet to the Languages of India (London: Longmans, Brown, 
Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 1859). 
 Vasudha Dalmia, The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions, 146–180.10
 For example the Serampore Mission Press cut and cast the first types for several scripts in the country, 11
or the American Mission Press in Bombay, where new systems of Devanagari type composition were 
introduced. Individuals in the service of the East India Company, like N. B. Halhed and Charles Wilkins 
introduced types for Bengali and Nastaliq. Bapurao S. Naik, Typography of Devanagari, 268–300; See 
also Fiona G. E. Ross, The Printed Bengali Character and its Evolution (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999).
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However, for the project of mechanical typesetting in the context of colonial India, 
there are strong reasons for a reversal of the customary formulation of technological 
enterprise – the idea that initiative from the metropoles drove improvements in an 
otherwise stagnant or retrogressive colony. It is known that in the early decades of 
the twentieth century, mechanical composition for Indian scripts was under 
consideration by manufacturers of typesetting machinery – invariably situated 
outside India, but with representatives in the country.  What has not been 12
examined, however, is the motivation behind these considerations, and the ample 
evidence that such developments had long been in demand by Indian printers and 
publishers by the time the demand was acknowledged by manufacturing companies 
in the 1920s and 30s.  Social and economical imperatives for faster composition and 13
larger circulation of printed matter across the country had come to the fore with the 
rise of nationalism, the independence movement, and the politics of language and 
script that emerged alongside. With limited recourse to technical know-how, 
particularly in an age of proprietary technologies, colonial printing establishments 
had responded with various schemes to make hand composition in Indian scripts 
faster and easier to the extent that it was possible, and by approaching 
manufacturers who could undertake the requisite technical experimentation for 
mechanical composition.   14
It was hardly incidental that in the multilingual landscape of the subcontinent the 
mechanization of Indian scripts began with a distinct focus on one script: 
Devanagari. In a linguistically diverse region, the rise of Hindi as the putative 
“national” language, and Devanagari as the related script, was a phenomenon deeply 
entrenched in political and communal battles that had been waged since the mid-
nineteenth century. A manifest outcome of this ongoing strife was the establishment 
in 1893 of the “Nagari Pracharini Sabha”, one of several partisan bodies emanating 
from the religious centre of Banaras (Varanasi) promoting and advocating the use of 
Hindi and Devanagari. Intensifying the linguistic and communal divisions already 
present, in 1900 the status of both language and script had been ensconced in the 
“MacDonnell moment” when under the colonial regime Hindi, written in Devanagari 
characters, was recognized as an official language distinct from Urdu, written in 
Perso-Arabic characters.   15
It was also not a coincidence that projects at the two major companies in the field of 
mechanical typesetting, Linotype and Monotype, were in fact initiated by colonial 
subjects – individuals, supported by local funds as well as local agendas, who made 
their way to London and New York to represent and pursue the demand in the 
colony. Debates on language and script, often along divisive lines, had been 
instigated by prominent figures of the period in the spheres of literature, publishing, 
politics, and religion in India. However, in the earliest stages of what became the 
Devanagari Linotype project, leading to the development of a machine for 
mechanically typesetting the script, four very different personalities were involved – 
 Graham Shaw, “Printing in Devanagari: the Evolution of Types in Devanagari Script”, Monotype 12
Recorder, new series no.2 (1980): 28–32. See also Ross, The Printed Bengali Character, 134–179.
 Modern machines had entered the South Asian market in the early 1900s and by 1914 products derived 13
not only from European technical expertise but also from American enterprise. David Arnold, Machines 
and the Making of Modern India (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2013) 40–42. 
Besides inquiries from Indian printing establishments to prominent manufacturers like Linotype and 
Monotype, the demand for mechanical typesetting also fuelled experiments like the Bhisotype, and 
adaptations of the typewriter and the Varityper to compose various Indian scripts.
 The Kirloskar Press in Pune, for instance, introduced a simplified system of typesetting Devanagari for 14
its eponymous magazine in the 1920s. See Naik, Typography of Devanagari, vol.2, 329–333.
 Alok Rai, Hindi Nationalism (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2001), 17–49. See also Akshaya Mukul, 15
Gita Press and the Making of Hindu India (Noida: HarperCollins, 2015), 4–8.
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Hari G. Govil, the “inventor” of Devanagari Linotype;  Chauncey H. Griffith, 16
assistant to the president and later vice president with responsibility for typographic 
development at Mergenthaler; Harold H. Bender, Professor of Indo-Germanic 
Philology at Princeton University and chief consultant to Mergenthaler on foreign 
scripts; and William Norman Brown, the first Professor of Sanskrit at the University 
of Pennsylvania, and consultant to Mergenthaler on its various Indian and South 
Asian projects from the 1930s to 1959. 
Hari Govil, the flag-bearer for Devanagari in New York, had been educated at the 
Banaras Hindu University, an institution then newly founded by the prominent 
political and Hindu nationalist figure Madan Mohan Malaviya, who was also the 
founder of the Hindu Mahasabha.  Govil himself founded the India Society of 17
America and the India Center in New York in the 1920s, promoting “a more accurate 
knowledge of the Hindu people, their life and ideals”.  He had made his way to New 18
York, and Mergenthaler Linotype, via London where his proposal for a Devanagari 
machine appears not to have been entertained – a portent of the apathy from the 
London offices of Linotype that would persist even after the project’s eventual 
completion in New York.   
Mechanical composition had already made inroads in other regions of the world, and 
in other scripts besides the Latin alphabet, by the time serious consideration to the 
Indian market was given by the companies developing the machines. It was, again, 
not incidental that starting in the early decades of the twentieth century, across an 
extended period of proprietary technology and corporate hegemony in type-making, 
the companies involved in the mechanization of Indian scripts functioned within the 
ideological framework of empire – rarely accommodating colonial subjects as 
historical actors, but instead as temporarily useful informants, echoing the “sahibs 
and munshis” mode of engagement of a different era.  To the extent that 19
typographic projects for Indian scripts featured in their own accounts and publicity 
literature, official company narratives often co-opted the initiative for these 
developments – not unlike the Herald Tribune headline – presenting them as their 
own altruistic ventures for the benefit of the colony. In the development of a 
“Devanagari machine”, though, both nationalist and orientalist points of view would 
appear to have found common cause.  The typographic network that enabled 20
mechanical typesetting of Devanagari contributed to the maintenance of established 
hierarchies – both within India along communal lines, and internationally in a 
colonial framework. 
 Hari G. Govil, US Patent for “Typographical Font”, (filed 1933, granted 1937). As a matter of fact, what 16
Govil patented was not the machine but the “scheme” for the adaptation of Devanagari by the method of 
splitting and combining characters.
 Several Hindu nationalist institutions were indeed founded in the 1920s, including the Rashtriya 17
Swayamsevak Sangh, to pursue communal agendas. See also, Sandria B. Freitag, Collective Action and 
Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
 “India’s Culture”, The Brooklyn Daily Eagle (13 April 1930). Govil’s background and activities in New 18
York are described briefly in Sarah A. Fedirka, Towards a Locational Modernism: Little Magazines and 
the Modernist Geographical Imagination (Arizona State University, 2008), 185.
 Sisir Kumar Das, Sahibs and Munshis: An Account of the College of Fort William (New Delhi: Orion 19
Publications, 1978).
 A schismatic definition of a pure and original “Hindu culture”, with Sanskrit as the language of its 20
classical antiquity, had been propounded by British and European scholars and Indologists and taken up 
enthusiastically by the nationalists. See for instance, Christopher R. King, One Language, Two Scripts: 
the Hindi Movement in Nineteenth Century North India (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1994), 23–
33. Both Bender and Brown were classical scholars for whom the predominance of Sanskrit, and by 
implication Devanagari, was not a questionable concern. The emphasis on defining the project as that for 
a “Devanagari machine” came from Bender.
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The machine in transit: New York, London, Calcutta, 
Bombay, and the launch of Devanagari Linotype in 
India 
Little is known about Hari Govil’s activities before the 1920s, the time of his arrival 
in America – only a biographical newspaper report from 1930 gives an embellished 
account of his life up to that point.  On 5th April 1932, Govil was officially retained 21
under contract from Mergenthaler to provide his services in adapting Devanagari to 
the Linotype according to his proposed scheme.  (Figure 1) The necessary push, and 22
backing, for this development may have been provided by the large-scale typesetting 
requirements for a project initiated at Princeton University. The Princeton Alumni 
Weekly of 5th April, 1929 carried a report on a project to catalogue, edit, and publish 
the manuscripts in the Garrett Collection.  The report went on to specify that the 23
Princeton University Press, who were to handle the publishing, would employ the 
machines and typefaces produced by Mergenthaler, equipped with various scripts. 
The plausibility of this project serving as the additional impetus is strengthened by 
the fact that Harold Bender, the chief consultant to Mergenthaler on the Devanagari 
project, was himself part of the editorial committee for the publication of the Garrett 
manuscripts.  On the other hand, the Monotype Corporation in London had 24
initiated its own Devanagari program – as early as 1921 but not successfully 
implemented till 1930.  Linotype’s interest may also have been occasioned as a 25
competitive response to this development. It is also likely that in the general 
economic slump of the period Mergenthaler saw investments in a new market less as 
a risky proposition and more as a diversification of its interests. Added to that was a 
certain assurance of academic utility for the machines – highlighted by the 
potentiality of a healthy clientele in the universities of America and abroad.   26
The entire process of design and manufacture took place in New York. The process of 
development as planned and executed by Mergenthaler was remarkably smooth. 
Studies and reports had been made, drawings prepared by Mergenthaler’s staff 
under Govil’s supervision, proofs checked and corrections incorporated to the extent 
of general approval from all involved. In addition, publicity matter had been given 
due consideration and the Devanagari Linotype machine was officially ready for 
launch in April 1933 – almost exactly a year from Govil’s official engagement in the 
project. It is from this point on that the process became more involved, encountering 
first the issues of positioning this development within the dynamics of international 
relations, and subsequently landing in the complications of reception and response 
that it had till then contrived to disregard. 
 See “India’s Culture”, The Brooklyn Daily Eagle (13 April 1930). 21
 Letter from C. H. Griffith to T. J. Mercer, Vice-President in charge of audits (5 April 1932). Box-P3627, 22
File 919-1, NMAH
 “Project to Further Human Knowledge: Garrett Collection of Manuscripts to be Edited – University 23
Press to Publish Results with New Equipment”, The Princeton Alumni Weekly (5 April 1929) 787.
 The Garrett Collection mainly comprised of Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish, and other Islamic 24
manuscripts and also included Egyptian papyri and Meso-American material. The collection, formally 
donated only in 1942, derived from Princeton alumnus (and Olympic champion) Robert Garrett, an 
eminent collector of medieval manuscripts who also underwrote the University’s purchases in the 1920s 
towards enlarging its collections.
 Monotype Archives, Salfords. “Index card for Series 155 Devanagari” (31 December 1921). The origins 25
and details of Monotype’s Devanagari development are not within the scope of this essay and have been 
covered elsewhere in Vaibhav Singh, “Devanagari type in the twentieth century: motivations, imperatives, 
technology, and the design process” (Unpublished PhD thesis, 2017).
 Letter from C. H. Griffith to H. H. Bender (14 March 1933). Box-P3627, File 919-1, NMAH. Bender had 26
indicated that the Harvard University Press would be a potential purchaser: it had “published a large 
number of Sanskrit texts in Devanagari”, under the Harvard Oriental Series.
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Govil’s contract with Mergenthaler required not only that he should demonstrate the 
machine as and when required, but also that he should sell two Linotype machines to 
customers in India, at prices and on terms acceptable to Mergenthaler.  Within this 27
arrangement Govil was to leave for Calcutta, where it was hoped the local offices of 
Linotype would provide him “a native mechanic skilled in the care and operation of 
the machine”.  Mergenthaler also suggested that Govil should stop at London on his 28
way to India, installing a machine at Linotype & Machinery (henceforth referred to 
as L&M), the London branch that managed the Company’s Indian operation, so that 
its workings could be demonstrated to possible Indian visitors. Remarkably though, 
regarding publicity for the new development, Govil was advised not to associate the 
machine with the British company directly. It is significant that the question of 
bilateral relations and contemporary political circumstances had been a secondary 
one throughout the period of the Devanagari development in America, and the 
question of acceptability revolved largely around technical and aesthetic 
dimensions.  Against the backdrop of the rising nationalistic movement in India, it 29
soon became clear that the British company was in no position to adopt more than a 
tentative approach to commercially pushing the new project, especially faced with 
factors outside the province of technological innovation and practical utility. 
Professional relationships and work practices in this scenario were also serious 
obstacles, as early communication between London and Calcutta immediately 
revealed. A. J. May, the manager of Linotype’s Calcutta office, on being informed of 
having to work with Govil, who had not yet sailed for India, wrote: 
It will be a rather difficult position, as I have had a little experience before of 
Indians who have a certain amount of foreign education grafted on. It will also 
be a difficult position for anyone of our staff if they have to go out and erect the 
machine […] If I send our best Indian mechanic, I can visualise the time he will 
have, and if a European goes, he cannot be expected to work under instructions 
of an Indian in this country. Even our customers would consider this ‘losing of 
face’.  30
Govil reached Calcutta on 11th August, the first Devanagari Linotype arrived there on 
13th September and was erected on 15 September 1933 – observing social protocol 
and acceptable arrangements. In the period before the arrival of the machine, Govil 
began training two operators with the aid of dummy keyboards. The machine was 
exhibited and a demonstration made to representatives from leading newspapers in 
Calcutta and a few others from the publishing industry. The second machine arrived 
in Bombay on 8 November 1933, and a demonstration was held at the showroom of 
L&M’s Bombay office on 14 December. Govil travelled extensively in India – not 
necessarily in accordance with plans envisaged by Mergenthaler Linotype and L&M 
– ostensibly in connection with the publicity of the Devanagari machine but also 
lecturing and addressing meetings on the adoption of Devanagari as “an all-India 
script”.  This was a trajectory of Govil’s own making and went against the general 31
 Letter from C. H. Griffith to Norman Dodge, President (10 May 1933). Box-P3627, File 919-1, NMAH27
 Ibid. It is not clear why the Company made this assumption, but it is likely that it overestimated labour 28
availability for a new machine. The situation was compounded by the fact that Linotype’s Calcutta office 
was to make the necessary arrangements through instructions from the British company.
 This does not imply that international politics was completely disregarded in the development– 29
Bender’s inquiry into Govil’s qualifications had cleared him as not being from the group of “men of the 
publicity, and especially propaganda types, representing some particular phases of Indian political or 
religious sectarian opinion”. H. H. Bender, “Devanagari on the Linotype”, 20–21 (25 January 1932). Box-
P3627, File 919-1, NMAH
 Letter from A. J. May to V. E. Walker (24 May 1933). Box-P3627, File 919-1, NMAH30
 Hari Govil, “Report on Govil’s visit to India for introducing the Devanagari Linotype” (3 April 1934). 31
Govil gave talks at All India Hindu Conference and Industrial Exhibition, Ajmer; Society for the 
promotion of Hindi Literature, Indore; and the Indian Oriental Conference, Baroda.
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approach of Mergenthaler, who did not stand to gain anything from offering partisan 
support to any one script over another. However, renewed negotiations of language 
and script priorities were instantly set in motion by the introduction of the 
Devanagari Linotype.  
By February 1934, one Devanagari Linotype had been sold – to the Prabasi Press, 
Calcutta run by Kedarnath Chatterjee, who having acquired the machine set about 
completely revising the keyboard layout, composition scheme, and the design of the 
typeface that it carried. This revision, which soon officially replaced Mergenthaler’s 
original offering entirely, achieved results that were not vastly different from the 
original, and in many instances even inferior to it, but it was found “acceptable”.  32
Govil managed to secure the sale of the second machine, fulfilling his contractual 
obligation, to Krishna Prasad Dar of the Allahabad Law Journal Press before 
returning to America.  Once he had departed, it appears that the Calcutta office 33
again found itself at the centre of criticism and activity that it was not equipped to 
handle, but also not in a position to disregard. In his report submitted to 
Mergenthaler, Govil bemoaned the lack of trained operators for Linotype 
composition in Calcutta and reported that the Indian offices of L&M were reluctant 
to spend money to secure them. Additionally, he noted: 
I found that the present staff of the Linotype Company is in no position to help 
the sales of the Devanagari Linotype. There is no one on the staff who knows 
Devanagari or understands anything about it. I am uneasy as to the fate of 
future sales during my absence. There is nothing I know that is being done by 
the India office to promote or stimulate sales of Devanagari Linotype while I am 
away. I must however say that Mr May assisted me in every possible way.  34
This seems to have compounded a series of conflicting impressions and predictions 
as to the immediate and future prospects of the development. From London, V. E. 
Walker, the deputy chairman and managing director of L&M, echoed A. J. May’s 
assessment that “it is generally thought that the prospect of the sale of a substantial 
number of machines is rather remote”.  Bender retaliated by pointing out Walker’s 35
continuing scepticism toward the project, and questioned Walker’s understanding of 
the situation: 
After all, Mr Walker bases his comments on reports from Calcutta, a region 
where Devanagari is not prevalent. The Devanagari machine should be pushed 
in regions where Devanagari is used.  36
It is useful to reiterate here that Mergenthaler had developed the machine 
specifically for Devanagari with an understanding that it was the most widely used 
script in the country, and then dispatched the machine to their Calcutta office that 
functioned as their centre of operations in India. However, given that the office was 
 This acceptability meant rather less than what Mergenthaler would have wished for. Purchasing the 32
machine gave Chatterjee a license in matters relating to its improvement, and since his Press was the 
machine’s main users at this stage, he had a greater say in determining acceptability – particularly for his 
own use – than others who provided criticisms or suggested revisions.
 Both machines were sold at a substantially discounted price and on a hire purchase contract, spread 33
over three years for one, and fifty-seven months for the other. Letter from V. E. Walker to C. H. Griffith 
(14 March 1934). Box-P3627, File 919-1, NMAH
 “Report on Govil’s visit to India for introducing the Devanagari Linotype” (3 April 1934) 10–11.34
 Letter from V. E. Walker to C. H. Griffith (14 March 1934). Box-P3627, File 919-1, NMAH35
 Letter from H. H. Bender to C. H. Griffith (19 May 1934) 2. Box-P3627, File 919-1, NMAH. Bender 36
wrote: “I have the impression that Mr Walker cherishes a certain prejudice against the Govil scheme; that 
he really doesn’t believe in it; but that he will, of course, do all that your Company desires him to do in 
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located squarely in a region where the predominant language and script were 
Bengali, the employees of the Company as well as the prospective users of 
Mergenthaler’s new offering could thus look askance at its immediate relevance and 
the apparent linguistic dissonance. The gradual shift in considerations from the 
limitations of the machine to the geography and affiliation of its users was only the 
beginning of a struggle that would soon turn into an elaborate project involving 
multiple individual and institutional actors – a project to sidestep questions of local 
technical capability and regain control of the script itself by “reforming” it.  
In the immediate aftermath of Govil’s visit, as the Calcutta office went about seeking 
possibilities for the Devanagari machine’s sale in India it ended up relaying 
statements of opinion and opposition from its primary and potential client base: 
newspaper proprietors, text-book publishers, and various government printing 
offices.  These were unfavourable criticisms – in most cases justifiably so – of the 37
peculiarities of the Linotype Devanagari design. Coming from local individuals, 
presses, and other printing establishments these responses were generally without 
critical or constructive commentary. The Calcutta office, unable to address the 
concerns directly, awaited solutions from London, and London merely transmitted 
their reports verbatim to New York, which led Griffith to declaim: 
On the whole, the reports from Calcutta […] clearly indicate complete lack of 
sympathy with or perhaps a complete misunderstanding of this entire 
development. I am inclined to feel that the latter is the case, and if we cannot 
obtain a closer and more sympathetic cooperation I do not think it would be 
good policy for us to carry on further.  38
For Mergenthaler, the lack of constructive detail in the criticisms coming from India 
made it difficult to determine “accurately what is required” – information was either 
withheld by parties bargaining in their own interests or not forthcoming from 
establishments seeking a more prominent role in the process than Mergenthaler was 
willing to concede.  The determination of specify and “usable information” was also 39
compounded by the political climate where the likelihood of the machine’s 
unacceptability due to it being a “British product” featured prominently in the 
launch and throughout the publicity campaign. With national sentiment in India 
“not very cordial to British business”, Govil reported that he had made it a point to 
“emphasize the fact that the Devanagari Linotype was an American product” – and 
that he believed the reason why the Indian press welcomed the machine with any 
enthusiasm and gave it wide coverage was “precisely because it was not British, but 
American” and developed in collaboration with one of their own countrymen.  In 40
response to the criticisms and reports of diminishing sales possibilities, Harold 
Bender went so far as to suggest an outright two-pronged approach – he 
recommended reminding those customers who were part of the British 
administration, like the various offices and colonial institutions in India, that “the 
company producing the machine is British”; and for those customers who were 
“primarily Indian and anti-British”, like various vernacular newspapers, the fact that 
the machine had been invented and developed in America was to be promoted.  41
 Among those who were consulted and offered criticisms were proprietors of leading newspapers like 37
Hindustan Times, National Call, The Leader; and printing establishments like The Job Press, Cawnpore; 
Radhey Shyam Press, Bareilly; The Indian Press, Allahabad; The Law Journal Press, Allahabad; and the 
Kadga Vilas Press, Patna.
 Letter from C. H. Griffith to Norman Dodge (11 June 1934). Box-P3627, File 919-1, NMAH38
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However, the bone of contention was not merely the political affiliations of the 
machine’s development, but also the autonomous way in which it had been 
developed. In the wake of Govil’s visit and publicising activities, some prominent 
newspaper publishers 
… thought that L&M Ltd [London] and not MLC [i.e. Mergenthaler, New York], 
had been responsible for Mr Govil’s visit and they could not understand […] 
why such an experiment was made in this country without previously referring 
the all-important matter of the type face to printing experts in the territory into 
which it was proposed to introduce the machine.  42
It is interesting to recall in this context Bender’s rationale, outlined in his report, for 
going through with the development first and seeking approval from the machine’s 
potential users at a later stage.  The primary concern had been to demonstrate the 43
new system as a practicable alternative, offering ease and speed of composition that 
was, at least in theory, far greater than what could be achieved by hand-setting 
Devanagari type.  The development had been carried out in the belief that its 44
“obvious” advantages would incentivise progressive establishments to make the 
investment required. Contrary to these expectations, Mergenthaler would soon find 
out, printing establishments in India were more willing to accept a slower method or 
a limitation-ridden development that acknowledged local agency rather than one 
that appeared to have been transported and imposed.  
The machine at rest: Devanagari Linotype and the script 
reform movement 
Towards the end of October 1934, the Indian National Congress – the largest and 
most influential political body in India’s independence movement – was scheduled 
to hold a meeting in Bombay. Finding this an excellent opportunity for a trial run, 
the local offices of L&M sought permission from the meeting’s arrangements 
committee to exhibit the Devanagari Linotype machine at the venue, and also probe 
the possibility of a book by Mahatma Gandhi to be composed mechanically.  45
Linotype’s Calcutta office had been given to understand by the prospective publisher 
that Gandhi had “specified that the book shall be set by linotype [sic]”.  Even 46
earlier, William Norman Brown – in his capacity as a “disinterested scholar” and a 
consultant to Mergenthaler – had asked Richard Gregg, a close friend of Gandhi’s, to 
broach the subject of Linotype’s Devanagari development, with which Gregg himself 
had been much impressed.  Given the sceptical reception of the Devanagari 47
Linotype over the first year of its existence, any favourable consideration by a 
national body held great significance for the machine’s prospects in India.  
 Report by Tom King (11 May 1934). Box-P3627, File 919-1, NMAH.42
 H. H. Bender, “Devanagari on the Linotype”, (25 January 1932). Box-P3627, File 919-1, NMAH43
 This assumption did not take into account other factors involved in text composition besides 44
technology, such as labour. The following section provides a relevant example. 
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As it turned out, the Indian National Congress committee refused permission for the 
exhibition of the Devanagari machine at its meeting in Bombay on the grounds that 
the machine was a “foreign invention”. However, as Brown put it, with “an admirable 
carelessness for logic” the committee permitted its printing manager to have the 
machine installed otherwise for the printing of Congress material officially required 
for the meeting, in both English and Hindi.  48
The text to be printed thus was the presidential address, bearing an imprint of 
Linotype – a veritable endorsement of the machine, underscoring the incongruities 
of policy and utility. Set to be printed and circulated at a large scale, it is difficult to 
underestimate the influence this opportunity may have wielded in the acceptance of 
Mergenthaler’s Devanagari. In an anticlimactic turn of events, however, after all the 
arrangements had been made, the sole Devanagari keyboard operator in the employ 
of Linotype – sent from Calcutta to Bombay for this purpose – could not compose 
the text in time owing to his lack of experience and slow composing speed.  The 49
work was eventually carried out at a local press by hand-setting using “about 50 
compositors”.  50
This incident may only be a minor footnote in the early history of mechanical 
composition in Devanagari but it points to some of the most remarkable issues in the 
social and political contexts within which this history must necessarily be viewed. As 
the aspirations of progressive, modern, nationhood gathered force, the dilemmas of 
cultural identity, and questions about the place of modern technology in it, located 
themselves at the centre of the debate throughout India’s pre- and post-
independence period.  Early in the first half of the century, the association of 51
technology and modern machinery with oppression and state power was widely 
translated into a nationalistic anti-technology stance, especially against the 
“foreign”. But within this broad ideological position, there was ample room to 
accommodate the utilitarian benefits of – and an active engagement with – 
technology on a day-to-day basis.  As exemplified in the Congress committee’s 52
ambivalent attitude towards Devanagari Linotype, the question of technology – even 
when “foreign” – was an open-ended, negotiable concern within the rhetoric of 
nationalism. 
In developing the Devanagari machine and the accompanying typeface 
independently, whether or not Mergenthaler expected to demonstrate its supremacy 
in the market, or to limit intervention from the colony, local printing and publishing 
establishments – followed by a segment of the literate elite – responded largely by 
challenging its authority, and by asserting their own agendas in the sociopolitical 
 W. N. Brown, “Report no.1” (September 1934).48
 W. N. Brown, “Report no.5” (3 November 1934). Box-P3627, File 919-2, NMAH. The Devanagari 49
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context of language and script. Mergenthaler’s enterprise enunciated power through 
technological exclusivity and large-scale production capability – areas that colonial 
subjects and local institutions were neither equipped to contest nor willing to 
sanction outright. However, the counter-bid for control could, and would, be made 
through a discourse of affiliation and ownership: of language, of script, of culture – 
assets that could be translated into knowledge unavailable to Mergenthaler, 
especially not in the form of “usable information”. 
The contradictions and dilemmas relating to matters of policy and the extent of 
political involvement existed on both sides of the development of the Linotype – in 
India as well as in America. Govil, with whom Mergenthaler started developing the 
machine towards the end of 1931, had first approached the Company in 1924 for the 
same purpose. C. H. Griffith recalled in an official memorandum: 
At that time [i.e. 1924] the printing and publishing industry in India was not in 
a prosperous condition, and there was little or no incentive for us to go ahead 
with this proposition. With the advent of the National movement in India 
during the latter part of 1930, [sic] and a series of Round Table Conferences 
between the British Government and Indian Nationals, held in London and 
elsewhere, interest in the native vernaculars, and particularly Hindi, was 
stimulated to a very great extent, and resulted in a wide-spread movement to 
improve and extend Indian national journalism.  53
It is important to note the connection of the nationalist movement with the 
development of printing in vernacular languages, and its consequent influence in 
Mergenthaler’s decision to undertake the Devanagari development in the 1930s, and 
not in 1924. Although in part the Devanagari Linotype came about as an 
acknowledgement of India’s political awakening and a response to its burgeoning 
propaganda apparatus, Mergenthaler made it a point to guard its commercial 
interests by adopting a non-partisan approach, ideologically steering clear of the 
forces behind local demand in India. However, once the machine was put on the 
market it was apparent that, in the prevailing political climate, arguments for speed 
and utility alone were not sufficient to sell it. The contradictions in Mergenthaler’s 
non-partisan approach were amplified when, operating between ideologically 
opposite camps, the Company resorted to obfuscating the machine’s British and 
American connections. 
The “wide-spread movement” in the 1930s that Griffith had observed in his 
memorandum was another program accommodating contradictions – it not only 
sought widening the reach of print communication with improvement in the printing 
and publishing of the regional vernaculars, but also envisioned countrywide political 
unification through evolving consensus on a national language and a common script 
for India. Devanagari was largely promoted as the “all-India” script, though not 
without necessary modifications required to represent the non-Hindi sounds of 
various languages of the country. In this scenario, the phenomenon of Devanagari 
“script reform” found a fertile public arena for the playing out of political, 
technological, and typographic aspirations. 
Whether set by hand or mechanically composed, metal type had obvious physical 
restrictions in representing syllabic scripts like Devanagari that require a great 
degree of overlap and overhangs in their formation (see Figure 2) – a characteristic 
not conducive to the linear setup deriving from an alphabetic script system. For the 
most part, hand-set Devanagari type did not offer the advantages of speed, 
efficiency, or quality in the script’s representation, prompting efforts to “modernize” 
the script itself – which generally meant adopting characteristics of a linear alphabet. 
However, the introduction of mechanical typesetting for Devanagari in the 1920s 
 C. H. Griffith, “Memorandum for A. P. Paine” (10 February 1936). Box-P3627, File 919-3, NMAH53
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and 30s – precisely with its promise of speed and efficiency – introduced further 
problems and restrictions in the representation of the script. The large number of 
characters required for text composition in Devanagari could not be accommodated 
on standard keyboards and technological adaptations tended towards a 
“simplification” of the script by reducing the number of characters to a bare 
minimum and approximating the principles of syllabic composition. Starting in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century the interplay of nationalist sentiment, notions 
of technological progress and modernity, along with long-standing problems of 
efficiency in typesetting had thus initiated a period of intense “script reform” activity 
in India, where several proposals were made by politically and culturally engaged 
individuals, as well as institutions, to simplify or modify Devanagari characters. No 
consensus could be achieved on these proposals that varied from slight modifications 
of the script to total graphic and systemic overhauls. The “reform” of Devanagari 
eventually managed to attain a very small measure of departure from the script’s 
original form and structure, though it did pave the way for a serious appraisal of 
issues related to its formal aspects and its standardisation.  
A number of script reform schemes for Devanagari had indeed been proposed and 
put to test prior to the introduction of mechanical typesetting in the early 1930s.  54
Among other issues, these had addressed ways to make text-setting faster and easier, 
but with assurances for the same offered by mechanical composition, a general shift 
in focus towards a more adaptive approach could be discerned across the schemes in 
the wake of Devanagari Linotype. On the one hand, this resulted in numerous reform 
schemes finding their primary function in furthering the agendas of national 
integration, usually by advocating a new common system of notation. But 
progressively it also meant that the reform proposals could be more and more 
radical, concerned largely with the abstract expression of tradition, modernity, or 
“scientific” reorganization through the modified script, rather than with the devising 
of practical solutions. 
Mergenthaler’s Devanagari had met with opposition immediately following the 
launch of the machine in 1933. Objections had focused partly on the design of the 
typeface, which was found to be too light and cramped, and partly on the manner of 
composition, which gave a distinctly unconventional appearance to the text. To 
accommodate the large number of Devanagari characters (600-800 in foundry type) 
on a standard Linotype keyboard (with 90 keys), Govil’s system of composition 
employed components of letters, divided vertically, which could then be combined to 
form complete individual letters. This would have been workable and unremarkable 
were it not for the Linotype machine’s inability to accommodate overhangs in 
composition – a key requirement for Devanagari. Effectively, Linotype composition, 
much like some other reform proposals, presented a reduced modification of the 
script. In this context of the machine’s reception, Mergenthaler could not afford to 
ignore the reform initiatives and activities around the standardization of Devanagari. 
Though its financial commitment had already been made in developing the machine 
according to Govil’s system, the Company had to acknowledge the evident risks in 
pursuing its own line of argument too strongly. New developments in the political 
arena, and the vagaries of national opinion in a crucial period of transition, could 
veritably result in the whole development being scrapped.  In addition, the 55
authorization of the reform movement by the appointment of committees at national 
level, with numerous conferences across the country, lent the entire enterprise of 
script reform a sense of urgency and importance – and not the least, transformative 
 Naik, Typography of Devanagari, vol. 2, 471. Naik lists more than fifteen reform schemes and 54
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power that could dictate what Mergenthaler’s “vernacular” machines were expected 
to produce. 
Mergenthaler found itself in a decidedly precarious position in this milieu – being an 
interested commercial body, the Company could not have a valid say in the matter of 
script reform. Nor did it want to get involved in the political fray on the grounds that 
the authority for modification and standardization lay with the appropriate national 
committees. However, by the very existence and influence of the system that the 
Devanagari Linotype machine provided, it was often assumed that Mergenthaler 
would act as both adjudicator and facilitator of new schemes. The authors of many 
reform proposals also assumed that the Company would oblige and produce test 
versions of their suggested modifications. Linotype’s India offices, managed by 
British staff not conversant in local languages or scripts, could not provide much 
help besides forwarding the many proposals and reform schemes they received, from 
the 1930s well into the 1960s.  Remarkably, after Indian independence, the “script 56
reform” activity of the earlier decades gradually turned into a “script 
standardisation” project. This change of rhetoric signalled the consolidation of the 
numerous disconnected and independent initiatives of the previous era under newly 
appointed governmental bodies that held a different kind of authority in 
independent India compared to what the traditional, reformist, or nationalist 
arguments for script change had possessed under the colonial administration. For 
Mergenthaler, this was the beginning of a long engagement with Devanagari and 
other Indian scripts. The users of the machine, on the other hand, found themselves 
in a position of active participation, in what was to become a revision continuum. 
Lasting as long as Linotypes were employed for Devanagari typesetting, this was to 
be a process fraught with dissatisfaction and incessant modification – and in the 
technological deadlock of hot-metal, a process driven largely by the constancy of 
contradictory preferences. (Figure 3) 
Conclusion 
The network of individuals and institutions involved in typographic design in India 
had a crucial role in shaping, and prioritising, the possibilities of printing in the 
country’s many languages. A combination of local and international actors, this 
network enabled not only the realization of print through technical expertise but also 
cultural validation and the pursuit of political aspirations through language and 
script. The production of printed matter could not be achieved without the mediation 
of a range of interested bodies that exercised their own rationale and agency in 
determining what was thus enabled. In pre-independence India, given the nuances 
of power struggles inherent in decisions related to language and script, the process of 
typographical change also afforded a space where colonial ideology could be “both 
transmitted and queried, produced and challenged”.  57
Mergenthaler’s Devanagari project had taken place within a framework that had 
prioritized completing the development first and seeking approval from its potential 
users as a subsequent step. The reception of the project and the gradual buildup of 
the “script reform” movement, on the other hand, had embraced an egalitarian 
process that called for active mass involvement in the written and printed 
manifestations of the script to shift the power balance. Whereas Mergenthaler 
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pioneered technical innovation and commercial entrepreneurship, the script reform 
movement generated a public platform for cultural aspirations, typographic and 
otherwise, in a politically charged environment. The improvements and changes 
proposed by various actors in this process were open-ended and incremental in most 
cases, and often with relatively little material investment in the particulars of the 
modification itself. Mergenthaler had, conversely, invested substantial amount of 
time and money in its Devanagari development with a view to its commercial 
feasibility in a potentially profitable market. The processes of script reform in India 
and Mergenthaler’s project had so little in common that their eventual – and 
prolonged – encounter could not be expected to lead to definite resolutions. It did, 
however, contribute immensely to a brief florescence of typographic engagement 
across the country. 
• • • 
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